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ABSTRACT
The Influence of Banks on Auditor Choice and
Auditor Reporting in Japan
by
JIANG Jin
Master of Philosophy

Debt as opposed to equity as the major source of financing and the influence of
banks on the corporate governance of listed companies are unique features of the
Japanese business environment. This thesis investigates how these features affect
the choice of auditor by Japanese listed companies and auditor reporting by
Japanese CPA firms on those companies. Pong and Kita (2006) provided some
univariate analyses and indicated that Japanese companies tended to select the
same external auditors as their main banks to reduce the agency costs. In this
thesis, I further examine the influence of main banks on auditor selection by
logistic regression and also investigate the influence of main banks on auditor
reporting quality after controlling self-selection bias. Using data from Japanese
listed companies in the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the 2002-2008 period, I
provide empirical evidence that companies with more reliance on main bank
loans are more likely to choose their main banks’ external auditors. Using the
Propensity Score Matching method and the Heckman two-step binary probit
model to control for self-selection bias, the empirical results support the
hypothesis that main bank auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions to
the borrowing companies than non-main bank auditors, providing evidence of
higher audit quality from main bank auditors. As a sensitivity test, I also use
discretionary accruals as a measure of audit quality. the results indicate that
companies who choose the same auditors as their main banks have higher audit
quality than companies who choose different auditors from their main banks. My
thesis contributes to the existing auditing literature in several ways. First, by
studying the influence of debt financing on auditor choice and auditor reporting,
this thesis extends the auditor market research that focuses mainly on the role of
auditors in equity markets to the bank-based market. Furthermore, this thesis also
complements auditing research on the influence of institutions on audit quality.
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The Influence of Banks on Auditor Choice and Auditor Reporting in Japan

Chapter 1 Introduction

This thesis examines how the influences from banks affect auditor choice and
auditor reporting in Japan’s audit market. Specifically, I study whether auditor
choice of listed companies in Japan is influenced by banks that provide these
companies with major debt financing and whether auditor reporting by Japanese
CPA firms on borrowing companies is influenced by banks who hire the same
auditors as the borrowing companies.
Prior research that examines auditor choice and auditor reporting has primarily
focused on the audit markets in the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and other countries
where companies rely heavily on well-developed equity markets for external
financing.

The research generally indicates that audits serve to monitor

management, contributing to the firms’ overall corporate governance, and thereby
protecting shareholders’ interests (e.g., Francis and Wilson, 1988). However, there
is limited empirical research that examines the effectiveness of external audits in
markets where debt is a more important source of corporate financing than equity
capital. In Japan, the financial system is well known for being predominantly
1

bank-based and companies rely heavily on bank loans for external financing. In this
situation, the major agency problem exists between managers and creditors, while
the major agency problem in equity market-oriented countries is between managers
and shareholders. In addition, many banks in Japan are also shareholders of the
borrowing companies, thus creating a unique role for banks in the corporate
governance of these companies. The institutional environment of Japan presents an
interesting arena for the study of auditor choice and auditor reporting.
In equity market-oriented countries, external auditors serve to mitigate the
agency problems between managers and shareholders. However, in these countries,
non-controlling shareholders and other stakeholders often do not have adequate
influence on managers to select their preferred external auditors. The controlling
shareholders who have concentrated ownership and influential roles in corporate
governance may choose low quality auditors in order to capitalize and sustain the
opaque gains derived from weak internal corporate governance (Copley and
Douthett, 2002; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996). The assurance of audit
quality in this situation is mainly through imposed regulations, quality standards of
the audit firms themselves, corporate governance of the auditees and perhaps a
relatively high litigation risk.
In Japan, many companies depend extensively on debt financing through bank
2

loans. Many companies have a main bank which is often the largest creditor and a
shareholder of the company. The main bank is not only the major source of
financing but also has a significant role in the corporate governance of the
borrowing companies. Before the 1980s, the main banks had dominant power in the
Japanese economy and corporate governance, and they could have access to the
private information of the borrowing companies easily and directly participated in
firm management through placing bank employees on boards of directors. Since the
1980s, several Japanese financial liberalization programs including the 1996 “Big
Bang” program have been promoted to relax the rules and regulations governing
capital markets with an aim to make equity markets more open and free, thus
encouraging companies to make greater use of equity financing. As a result of these
liberalization programs, the main banks have lost their dominant power in the
Japanese economy, as companies started to switch to equity financing (Osaki, 2005).
However, banks still play an important role in corporate financing.
Extant literature has paid little attention to whether the main banks do rely on
external auditors to enhance their monitoring of the borrowing companies and
whether the main banks

influence

the selection of the external auditors of

borrowing companies. Pong and Kita (2006) provided descriptive statistics on the
influence of main banks on companies’ auditor choice for the year 2000. They
3

found that companies in Japan tend to select the same external auditors as their
main banks. However, they just did some univariate analysis and did not establish
econometric model to run multivariate regression.
In this thesis, I provide an in-depth empirical examination of the influence of a
company’s main bank on the auditor choice of the company and on auditor
reporting behavior in Japan for the period 2002-2008. Based on agency theory, I
expect that the more important the role of main banks in the borrowing companies’
financing and corporate governance, the more likely that the borrowing companies
will select their main banks’ auditors as their external auditors. That is, the more
dependence the companies have on main bank loans compared to equity, the more
likely that the companies will select the same auditor as their main bank due to
influences from the bank and the past economic relationship between the bank and
the auditor. Given the bank’s confidence in its auditor, using the same auditor as the
bank could reduce default risk and consequently lower the cost of debt capital for
the borrowing company.

In addition, I expect main banks to influence the quality

of auditor reporting as the bank is eager to know whether the borrowing company
has continued to meet debt covenants. If the audit quality of the borrowing
company’s auditor cannot satisfy the requirements of the main bank, the main bank
may pressure the borrowing company to fire the auditor. In addition, the auditor
4

may also lose the business as the external auditor of the main bank. Thus, given that
main bank auditors will have much to lose if they do not provide quality audits, they
should be more likely to issue modified opinions to the borrowing companies when
appropriate, compared with the situation where the bank and the borrowing
company choose different auditors.
I test my hypotheses by analyzing companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange during the period 2002-2008. Consistent with my expectations, I find that
companies with higher bank loans relative to equity are more likely to choose their
main bank’s external auditor as their own auditor, after controlling for other firm
characteristic variables expected to affect auditor selection. Moreover, using the
propensity score matching method and the Heckman two-step binary probit model
to correct self-selection bias, I find that main bank auditors are more likely to issue
qualified opinions than non-main bank auditors, indicating higher audit quality.
My thesis contributes to the existing auditing literature in several ways. First,
there is little research that examines the demand for quality audits as a corporate
governance mechanism in countries where company financing relies mainly on
bank loans rather than on the equity market. By studying the influence of debt
financing on auditor choice and auditor reporting, this thesis extends the audit
market research that focuses mainly on the role of auditors in equity markets to the
5

bank-based market. Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003) study the role of external audits
in Germany where companies also rely heavily on bank loans and find a positive
relation between German companies’ demand for quality audits and the interest of
creditors. However, they did not specifically address the impact of creditors on
auditor reporting. I complement their research by studying the influence of banks on
auditor choice and auditor reporting in the unique institutional setting of Japan.
Furthermore, this thesis complements auditing research on the influence of
institutions on audit quality.

For example, Chan, Lin and Wong (2010) study how

institutional features such as the extent of state ownership, the maturity of capital
markets and legal systems affect auditors’ reporting decisions and find that a weaker
institutional environment results in lower quality audits. Chan, Lin and Mo (2006)
examine how auditor reporting is affected by political-economic institutions in
China and conclude that government influence can reduce the audit quality of local
auditors. However, I should point out that the political-economic institutions in
China are very different from those in Japan. The interest of government owners
of listed companies in China is also very different from the interest of major
creditors of Japanese companies. However, I echo their findings that the
institutional environment can have a significant impact on audit quality.
My study suggests that auditors in Japan play a monitoring role to mitigate the
6

conflicts between the management of the borrowing companies and their creditors
(main banks), and that these companies will choose a suitable auditor to lower the
cost of debt capital. Previous research mainly emphasizes the signaling effect of
audit quality differentiation and indicates that hiring a high-quality auditor will be a
signal of good corporate governance and credible financial reporting to investors
(Palmrose, 1984). For my study, if borrowing companies choose the same external
auditors as their main banks, they could improve the expectations of the main banks
regarding the monitoring function of auditors, provide a signal to the major
creditors on the quality of their financial reporting and mitigate the information
asymmetry between the main banks and the borrowing companies, which will
eventually lower the cost of debt capital for them. This unique agency relationship
among company management, creditors (main banks) and auditors in Japan is quite
different from the agency relationship among corporate management, shareholders
and auditors in other well developed equity-oriented markets.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the
relevant institutional background in Japan and Chapter 3 develops the research
hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the research method. Chapter 5 discusses the
empirical results and the sensitivity tests and Chapter 6 concludes.

7

Chapter 2 Institutional Background

2.1 Financial reporting and auditing in Japan
The Japanese accounting system is based on the “Financial Accounting Standards
for Business Enterprises” which integrates the Japanese Commercial Code (JCC),
Stock Exchange Law (SEL), and tax regulations. Under the JCC, corporations are
required to provide annual financial statements to shareholders in accordance with
its prescribed accounting rules. Under the SEL, corporations which offer securities
to the public are required to file a registration statement containing audited financial
statements with the Ministry of Finance (Taylor, 1997).
Large companies in Japan typically employ two types of auditors: corporate
auditors and independent auditors. Corporate auditors are employees of a company
elected at the shareholders’ meeting and they do not need to be certified public
accountants. Very often, companies establish a board of corporate auditors to
monitor the activities of management in the discharge of their duties and also try to
ensure that no fraud or illegal act takes place (Pong and Kita, 2006). However, the
effectiveness of corporate auditors has been questioned due to their frequent lack of
independence from top management and their inability to prevent or detect frauds
committed by management (Fukukawa, Mock and Wright, 2006). Thus, external
8

auditors are needed to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate auditors and audit the
companies’ financial statements (Fukukawa, Mock and Wright, 2006).
An important feature of the Japanese audit market is the strong presence of Big
4 audit firms through alliances with one or more large Japanese audit firms. The
concentration level of the Big 4 in the Japanese audit market for listed companies
was 84% in 2007 (Grant Thornton, 2007). This is a high level of concentration,
although lower than that in the US and the UK which have both been over 95% in
recent years (Grant Thornton, 2007).
Another important characteristic of the history of the Japanese audit market is
that there has been relatively little auditor litigation as the country is much less
litigious than the U.S. (Wingate, 1997; Ginsburg and Hoetker, 2004).

However,

litigation does occur and can have potentially devastating consequences for CPA
firms. For example, in 2006, ChuoAoyama, a

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)

affiliate in Japan, was involved in a major accounting fraud. In May 2006, the
Financial Services Agency suspended the operations of ChuoAoyama (Skinner and
Srinivasan, 2010). This suspension caused the loss of almost 30 percent of
ChuoAoyama’s clients (The Daily Yomiuri, 2006)1. Thus, the litigation against
ChuoAoyama caused reputation loss and serious damage to the market share of
PwC in Japan.
9

2.2 Characteristics of the Japanese capital market
Between the Second World War and the 1980s, one traditional feature of the
Japanese economy was the dominance of Keiretsu conglomerate groups, which
provided a network for information-sharing and business combinations for their
corporate member companies (Ouandlous and Philippatos, 1999). Most companies
in Japan either belonged to the Keiretsu or were affiliated with group members of
the Keiretsu. Corporate groupings composing the Keiretsu had reciprocal ownership
interests, long term business contractual arrangements and close financial ties to
Japanese banks, which were usually regarded as the core of each Keiretsu group.
The major source of corporate financing was bank loans (Ouandlous and
Philippatos, 1999).
Typically, most Japanese companies have a main bank, which is often the
largest provider of debt financing (Morck et al., 2000; Hoshi et al., 1990). In
addition, the main bank usually acts as a shareholder of the borrowing companies.
Until recently, the banks in Japan were only allowed to hold a maximum of 5% of
the shares in the borrowing companies. This proportion may seem relatively small.
However, viewed from the power of Keiretsu groupings where the main banks and
other companies often exchange equity shares with each other to form stable
10

shareholding blocks, this small holding can give the main bank an opportunity to
exert a significant influence over the corporate governance of the borrowing
companies (Bies, 2003). Thus, main banks in Japan can play a significant role in
corporate governance of companies through simultaneously holding debt and
ownership stakes and they frequently exert control through direct and indirect
involvement in the management of their borrowing companies. For instance, banks
may place their employees on the board of directors of the borrowing companies.
The role of the main bank in the Japanese economy has led to stable and long-term
relationships between Japanese banks and their corporate clients, in contrast to the
banks in the U.S. or other western economies whose relationships with their
corporate clients are often described as short-term, less stable and more costly
(Ouandlous and Philippatos, 1999). For borrowing companies, having a main bank
provides more stability and less fluctuations in cash flows compared with
bank-independent companies (Hoshi et al., 1990). Even when the borrowing
companies are in financial distress, the main bank can continue to deliver debt
financing to rescue them and prevent them from bankruptcy (Sheard, 1989). During
the period between Second World War and the 1980s, the core status of the main
banks in Keiretsu Groups and the borrowing companies’ significant economic
dependence on them gave the main banks a dominant role in corporate governance.
11

The close ties that a main bank had with its customers gave it relatively easy access
to private information in the borrowing companies. Thus the information gap
between the main bank and its customers narrowed, which resulted in relatively less
demand for high quality external auditing during that period. (Hoshi and Kashyap,
2001; Skinner and Srinivasan, 2010).
During the 1990s, ongoing economic problems in the Japanese economy
necessitated a process of reforms in financial systems (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998).
As a consequence of the Japanese Big Bang reform in 1996, the relaxation of
regulations in capital markets resulted in a shift toward equity from debt financing
and easier access to raising capital by issuing shares, especially for some big and
stable manufacturing corporations. The Japanese Big Bang program was supposed
to have been completed by the end of March 2001 (Osaki, 2005). After a series of
financial deregulation and liberalization programs during the 1990s, companies in
Japan had more opportunities to obtain
especially from institutional

external financing from capital markets,

and foreign investors. Consequently , the ownership

interests of main banks in borrowing companies generally became smaller. The
main banks gradually lost their dominant power in the corporate governance of the
borrowing companies. They can no longer access the private information of
borrowing companies or participate in corporate governance as easily. Therefore,
12

they must rely more on external auditors as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate
moral hazard problems in the borrowing companies.

13

Chapter 3 Hypotheses Development

In this section, I develop two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis examines the
influence of main banks on auditor choice by Japanese listed firms. The second
hypothesis examines audit quality for borrowing companies that use the same
external auditors as their main banks. I develop the above hypotheses from the
following perspectives.

3.1 Agency theory and the monitoring role of audits
Prior research uses agency theory to explain the demand for audit services as a
monitoring function to improve the principal-agent contractual relationship (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Agency theory
helps explain the utility of audit services in terms of the role of audited financial
statements in the contractual arrangements among managers, shareholders and
debtholders (Palmrose, 1984). Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss the agency costs
generated by the divergence between managers’ interests and those of bondholders,
and suggest that bondholders will realize that managers’ interests diverge from
theirs; hence, the price investors will pay for bonds will reflect the effect of
divergence between the managers’ interests and theirs. Therefore, managers have
14

incentives to establish various covenants in indenture provisions to constraint their
behavior in order to reduce the agency conflicts and hence increase bond prices.
In my analysis, the main banks will also take into account the effect of
divergence between managers’ interests and their own in determining the interest
rates for loans. Managers will therefore find it in their interests to include various
accounting-based covenants in lending agreements with the main bank to reduce
agency costs and hence lower the interest rates that main banks charge. The
enforcement of such accounting-based debt covenants creates a demand for audited
financial statements and managers have incentives to employ a reliable independent
external auditor to demonstrate that they will not manipulate the financial
information or take actions to harm principals’ interests (Watts, 1977; Chow, 1982;
Francis and Wilson, 1988). Auditors lend credibility to financial information
provided by management and help reduce management incentives and opportunities
for exploiting information asymmetry (Palmrose, 1984). However, auditors are also
agents and audit effort is unobservable, leading to a moral hazard problem and a
new source of inefficiency (Palmrose, 1984; Antle, 1984; Baiman et al., 1991). The
principal (main bank) will anticipate this new agency problem and consider the
perceived efforts and quality of auditors of borrowing companies and incorporate
their expectations into the contract price with borrowing companies. The extent to
15

which an audit will reduce agency costs depends on the level of independence and
competence of the auditor (Watt and Zimmerman, 1983; Antle, 1984). The
differences in managers’ incentives and opportunities to exploit the information
asymmetry for their own interests imply differences in the demand for audit service
quality (Palmrose, 1984).
Many studies have investigated an

association between agency cost variables

and the selection of quality-differentiated auditors. DeFond (1992) finds a positive
relationship between the percentage of debt in the capital structure and the selection
of auditors with higher brand name reputation. Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003)
examine auditor choice in the German audit market and find that debtholders have a
greater demand for audit market leaders than for other auditors. Thus, the greater is
the need for monitoring, the higher the quality of auditors is demanded (Palmrose,
1984). As Japanese firms typically have a high level of debt in the capital structure,
high quality audits should be needed to improve the credibility of accounting
information and to verify compliance with debt covenants.
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the joint probability of detecting and
reporting material financial statement errors and concludes that the larger the size of
an audit firm, the more likely it will supply a high level of audit quality. Prior
auditing research usually treats the Big 4 (previously Big N) auditing firms as a
16

homogeneous brand-name group with high auditing quality (Palmrose, 1984;
DeFond, 1992). The audit market in Japan is dominated by Big 4 audit firms who
audit more than 80 percent of listed firms in Japan. As almost all big banks in Japan
employ the Big 4 as their external auditors, I further expect that the main bank will
treat their external auditors as important watch dogs in monitoring borrowing
companies. Compared to non-main bank auditors, main-bank auditors should be
more likely to signal their willingness to act in the interests of the main bank
through making their greatest efforts to testify to the fairness of the financial
information and report any breaches of debt covenants. An added incentive for
main-bank auditors to report truthfully is provided by the economic connection they
have with the main bank; monitoring the borrowing company well simultaneously
maintains their position as the external auditor of the main bank and improves their
chances of being selected as the external auditors of other clients of the main bank.
Therefore, the external auditor of a main bank should be the preferred auditor that
the main bank can trust and rely on. From the perspective of the borrowing
company, the manager has incentives to hire the external auditors of the main bank
to improve the expectations of the main bank and reduce the interest rates of bank
loans.2 As the main bank loans represent a significant part of total bank loans, lower
interest rates of main bank loans will lead to lower interest rates of total bank
17

loans.3 The larger the percentage of debt capital, the more benefits the borrowing
company will gain. Thus, I expect that the larger the proportion of main bank loans
compared to equity capital, the more likely that the company will choose the same
auditors as its main bank to reduce the costs of debt capital, as reflected in the
following hypothesis:
H1: The higher a company’s bank loans relative to its equity, the more likely the
company will choose its main bank’s external auditor as its own external auditor.

3.2 Auditor Reporting
Companies may have incentives to collude with auditors to manipulate financial
statements to get opaque gains and to prevent declines in share price. Listed
companies in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in Japan have incentives to make
side-contracts with auditors to facilitate their meeting of the TSE’s Criteria for
Assignment to the First Section Market4 or to avoid delisting. From the perspective
of auditors, they may benefit from collusion with clients through gaining higher
audit fees and maintaining client relationships. Thus, they may allow clients to
manipulate the financial statements and not issue a modified opinion, which may
lead to an increase in capital costs and trigger reassignment from First Section
Market to Second Section Market or even delisting. Meanwhile, the auditors could
18

also bear the risk of incurring the cost of reputation loss and litigation. However, as
mentioned above, in Japan litigation costs to auditors are essentially non-existent
and thus, the legal system does not provide sufficient incentives for auditors to
deliver quality audits, and reputation costs are very important in the Japanese audit
market (Skinner and Srinivasan, 2010). In this aspect, the Japanese audit market is
similar to that of China (Chan and Wu, 2010). As explained earlier, main bank
auditors face even higher reputation costs because the main banks may influence the
borrowing companies to fire them and they may also lose their positions as external
auditors of the main bank. Furthermore, the main banks are usually the center of the
Keiretsu group. The main banks may threaten their external auditors by asking all
their borrowing clients not to use their audit services if they cheated the main banks.
On the other hand, if the external auditor of a main bank does a good job, the
external auditor may make significant inroads into the whole network around the
main bank and get a substantial reputation gain. Therefore, the external auditor of a
main bank has significant incentives to offer a high quality audit services for the
borrowing companies of the main bank. Conversely, the main bank auditors have
more reputation costs to incur if there is an audit failure. Thus, compared to
non-main bank auditors, the main bank auditors should be less likely to collude
with the managers of borrowing companies. This line of reasoning suggests the
19

following hypothesis:
H2: Compared to non-main banks’ external auditors, main banks’ external auditors
are more likely to provide higher quality audits to borrowing companies.

20

Chapter 4 Research Method

4.1 Data collection
I collected auditor identities, audit opinion types, and client firm characteristics of
listed Japanese companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange

for 2002-2008 from the

Osiris Database (Bureau Vandijk Company). The 2002-2008 period was chosen
because the Big Bang reform program was supposed to complete by 2001 (Osaki,
2005). And this period allowed me to examine the influence of banks on auditor
choice and auditor reporting during a period when the banks had lost their dominant
power but still maintained a significant influence over borrowing companies.
Following Morck et al. (2000) and Hoshi et al. (1990), I take the largest lender
in each year as the main bank for each company. I obtained the name of largest
lenders and the number of main bank loans from the Needs Database (Nikkei Inc.).
In Japan, two or more banks often belong to one Financial Group and hire the same
external auditors. In such cases, I treat the entire Financial Group as one main bank
and sum the loans of each member bank to get the total main bank loans for a
company. The Appendix provides information on the auditors of the main banks.
In my analysis, I excluded companies with missing financial or audit data.

I

also exclude financial institutions and insurance companies because they have
21

different financial reporting requirements. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the sample
consists of 2095 firm-year observations of Japanese listed companies over the
2002-2008 sample period. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for auditor
choice over the period of the study. On average, 32 percent of companies have the
same external auditors as their main banks. Panel C of Table 1 provides statistics for
the type of audit opinions issued. Following previous empirical studies (e.g., Chan
et al., 2006), I classify qualified opinions, adverse opinions and disclaimers as
“modified” opinions and in my sample, there were only 5 adverse opinions and
disclaimers combined. As shown in Table 1, the percent of modified opinions
decreased dramatically since the year 2002. One possible explanation for this
phenomenon is that in April, 1999, Japanese accounting standards began a process
of reforming, which is often called “Bing Bang reform of accounting standards”
(Asami, 2006). As it took some years for Japanese companies to adapt to the new
accounting standards, this could explain why the percentage of modified opinions
is relatively high during the early years of my sample.

Panel D shows the

descriptive statistics on the frequencies of modified versus clean opinions that main
bank and non-main bank auditors issued during the sample period. On average,
main bank auditors issued more modified opinions than did non-main bank auditors
(4.8% vs. 3.4%). This difference is 4.8 percent vs. 3.0 percent after correcting for
22

self-selection as explained later.
[Insert Table 1 about here]

4.2 Model specification
In this study, I use two logistic regression models to test the auditor choice and the
auditor reporting decisions.
Auditor _choice = ß0 + ß1 MBankloan_equity + ß2 Size + ß3 ROA + ß4 Leverage
+ß5 Market + ß6 No.Subsidiary + ß7 Current_ratio + ß8
Inventory + ß9 Growth + ß10 year2007 + ß11 year2008 + ε
(1)
Auditor_opinion = ß0 + ß1 Auditor _choice + ß2 Size + ß3 ROA + ß4 Leverage
+ ß5 Current_ratio + ß6 Beta +ß7 Inventory
+ ß8 Opinion_lag + ß9 Market + ß10 Loss + ε

(2)

The dependent variable for Model (1), Auditor_choice, equals 1 if the external
auditor of the borrowing company is the same as its main bank, and 0 otherwise.5
The test variable MBankloan_equity, which is the ratio of main bank loans to equity,
measures the degree of a company’s reliance on its main bank for debt financing.
The larger the MBankloan_equity, the more the company depends on main bank
loans rather than equity, and I hypothesized that as this ratio increases, companies
will be more likely to choose the same external auditor as their main bank.
The dependent variable for Model (2), Auditor_opinion, equals 1 for modified
opinions and 0 otherwise. I use the frequency of modified opinions to measure audit
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quality. Several studies (DeFond et al., 2000; Chan et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2008)
suggest that the frequency of modified opinions has reasonable power to capture
variations in audit quality in different research settings. DeAngelo (1981) defined
audit quality as the joint probability that a given auditor will both discover
(competence) and report (independence) a beach on a given client’s audit. Auditors
with greater independence are expected to be more resilient to client pressure to
issue a clean audit report when a modified report is appropriate (DeFond et al.,
2000). The test variable in model (2), Auditor_choice, is the same as the dependent
variable in Model (1). I expect that the main bank auditors are more likely to issue
modified opinions to the borrowing companies.

4.3 Control variables for Model (1)
I include company characteristic variables, such as client size, current ratio,
leverage and return on total assets, which reflect the financial condition of the firms
(Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1987), in the Auditor_choice model. I use the
logarithm of the company’s year-end total assets to proxy for client size. Larger
corporations, which are well known and established in the market place, are more
able to attract investors in the equity market (Ouandlous and Philippatos, 1999).
In contrast, smaller corporations must rely more heavily on loans from their main
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banks than larger corporations and thus should be more likely to hire the same
auditors as their main banks. Hence, I expect the sign of the Size coefficient to be
negative. I include ROA (net income before tax over year-end total assets) to
measure companies’ profitability. Several prior studies have found that firm
performance (profitability) may affect the choice of auditors (e.g., Sainty et al.,
2002). More profitable companies are more likely to hire their main banks’ auditors
to testify to their performance to the main bank.
As mentioned above, the stocks listed in the TSE are separated into the First
Section for larger and better performing companies and the Second Section for
mid-sized companies. Thus, I include the variable Market (First vs. Second section)
to reflect different auditor choice behaviors of companies listed in these two market
sections and expect that companies in the First Section are more likely to select the
main bank auditor. Palmrose (1984) indicates that the complexity and diversity of
an organization’s activities and operations influence agency costs. Complexity and
diversity mean a potential for increases in the number of agency relationships as
well as the remoteness of principals from the observation of agents’ actions.
Accordingly, I include the number of subsidiaries in the auditor choice model to
capture organizational diversity and complexity, and expect that the more
subsidiaries a company has, the more likely it will choose its main bank auditor to
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reduce agency costs.
To control for the overall level of debt, I use the leverage variable, which is the
ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets and expect that companies with
higher leverage will be more dependent on their main bank and thus more likely to
choose the main bank auditor as a significant part of the total liability normally
consists of bank loans.

To control for short-term financial liquidity, I use the

current ratio (current_ratio) in the auditor choice model and expect that companies
with higher financial liquidity have less reliance on main bank loans and are thus
less likely to choose the same external auditors as their main banks. I also consider
the ratio of inventory to year-end total assets as it reflects companies’ financial
condition, i.e., a higher ratio, ceteris paribus, indicates a weaker financial condition.
Thus, I expect that companies with a high ratio of inventory to total assets will be
more likely to choose their main bank’s external auditor to lower their capital costs.
Anderson et al. (2004) report that firms with greater growth potential inclined
to choose high-quality auditors in order to benefit from the signaling effect and
enhance their reputation. I proxy for growth by the ratio of total sales of the current
year divided by total sales of the previous year. I expect that companies with high
growth potential are more likely to choose the main bank’s auditors. I also control
for the year effect in 2007 and 2008. As previously discussed, in 2006,
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ChuoAoyama Audit Corporation, PwC's Japanese affiliate, was suspended by the
Financial Services Agency. In 2007, Misuzu, which is a new name for
ChuoAoyama after resuming operation, was dissolved because of additional
accounting frauds. These two events may have influenced companies’ auditor
choice in 2007 and 2008 respectively. For example, assume the external auditor of
one company is PwC before 2007 while its main bank’s auditor is KPMG. This
company may be reluctant to change its external auditor from PwC to KPMG
before the PwC scandals occurred, because it may have established a long-term
relationship with PwC and felt it would

be costly to terminate this relationship.

However, the company should be more willing to switch its auditor from PwC to
KPMG in 2007 or 2008 because of the PwC scandals.
4.4 Control variables for Model (2)
Financial characteristic variables are also included in the opinion model. As larger
companies tend to be more financially stable than smaller companies and more
profitable companies are less likely to manipulate financial statements than others
(DeAngelo, 1981; Chan, Lin and Mo, 2006), I expect that Size and ROA will be
negatively associated with the probability of receiving a modified opinion (Chen et
al., 2001; Schwartz and Menon, 1985). For profitability, I also include a dummy
variable loss which equals 1 if the net income before tax is less than zero. For
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financial liquidity, I expect that companies with higher leverage will be more likely
to receive modified opinions, while companies with higher current ratios will be
less likely to receive modified opinions. The ratio of inventory to total assets is also
considered as it suggests that a modified opinion is more likely if a firm is in poor
financial condition.
Prior studies find that audit opinion type is highly persistent (Lennox, 1999,
2000). Consequently, I include the type of opinion in the previous fiscal year and
expect that companies that received modified opinions in the previous year will be
more likely to receive modified opinions in the current year. As mentioned above,
the companies listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange are separated into the First and
Second Section Markets based on company size and performance. Thus, I also
include the variable Market in the audit opinion model and expect that companies in
the First Section Market are less likely to receive qualified opinions. According to
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987), market returns

capture information

above and beyond that reported in the financial statements and auditors may use
market return measures to infer information incorporated in market prices. Thus, I
include a stock market variable Beta, a key parameter in the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM), as a potential determinant of auditor opinions. Beta measures the
return on a company’s stock in relation to the market as a whole.
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I expect that the

higher a company’s expected market return (the larger value of Beta), the less likely
the firm will obtain a qualified audit report. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive
statistics on the regression variables and variable definitions used.
[Insert Table 2 about here]

4.5 Matched propensity score
The test variable Auditor_choice in model (2) is the dependent variable in model (1)
and the exogeneity of this variable, is based on the assumption that client firms
randomly choose their audit firms (Ireland and Lennox, 2002). However, Model (1)
indicates that companies may self-select their preferred auditors according to firm
characteristics and other unobservable variables. This may cause a potential
self-selection bias if the estimation procedures of OLS ignore the issue of
non-random selection of auditors (Maddala, 1991). The traditional approach to
control for self-selection bias in the accounting and auditing literature is the
two-step Heckman selection model. In the first step the researcher uses instruments
to estimate the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR), the ratio of the probability density
function over the cumulative distribution function of a distribution, which is
commonly applied in regression analysis to take account of selection bias. In the
second step the IMRs are included in the primary model of interest as a control for
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the effects of self-selection (Greene, 1981). Researchers usually use the two-step
Heckman selection model to control for selectivity with respect to the company’s
choice of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors (e.g., Khurana and Raman, 2004).
Francis and Lennox (2008) examine the potential pitfalls associated with using
the Heckman procedure to control for self-selection bias and assess its application
in accounting research. They demonstrate that the selection model is quite sensitive
to minor changes in model specification and they suggest the use of matched
propensity scores as an alternative approach to the two-step Heckman model to
control for self-selection bias. Clatworthy, Makepeace, and Peel (2009) also find
that Heckman two-step corrections for selection bias in audit fee models concerning
Big 4 audit premiums are very sensitive to the model specification and the sample
used. They also employ the propensity matching methods to deal with the
self-selection problem.
Following the methods they used, I create a matched sample based on the
predicted probabilities from the auditor choice logistic regression using the nearest
neighbor matching method. In my analysis, the companies choosing main bank
auditors are matched to those choosing non-main bank auditors on the basis of the
predicted probability of employing a main bank auditor. I first predict the
propensity for a company to choose a main bank auditor based on the auditor choice
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model and then sort the sample by the predicted probabilities. For each company in
the experimental sample (to-be-matched company) actually having the same auditor
as its main bank, I identify two adjacent companies (candidate companies) that have
the closest predicted probability as potential matches. I then employ the following
matching rule: (a) if only one of the two candidate companies has a different auditor
from the main bank, I choose that one as the matching company, (b) if both
candidate companies have different auditors from their main banks, I choose the one
with the closest predicted probability, (c) if both candidate companies have the
same auditors as their main banks, I determine that there is no suitable match and
drop this “to-be-matched” company. I apply this rule to each “to-be-matched”
company actually choosing a main bank auditor and create matching pairs. If two
matching pairs share the same matching company which actually has no non-main
bank auditor, I keep the matched pair with the smaller difference in predicted
probabilities. The goal of this rule is to ensure that the sample of firms choosing the
same auditor as their main banks have similar characteristics as the sample of firms
choosing different auditors. The mean value of absolute difference in the propensity
scores of each matched pair is 0.00016, and the maximum value is 0.0089, so
companies choosing main bank auditors and companies choosing non-main bank
auditors are very closely matched. Through this propensity score matching, I obtain
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1130 firm-year observations in the subsample. Then I estimate the logistic model
for auditor opinion using the companies in the matched-pair sub-sample.
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Chapter 5 Empirical Results

5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on auditor opinions and company
characteristics by auditor type based on 2095 firm-year observations over the
sample period 2002-2008. Significant differences can be found between the two
auditor types along three company characteristics, namely MBank_equity, Leverage
and Market. Consistent with my expectations, companies choosing the same
auditors as their main banks are more likely to have a higher ratio of bank loans to
equity, to have higher leverage, and to be included in the First Section Market.
Although the two-tailed P-value is not significant for the audit opinion mean test,
the mean value of audit opinion for companies choosing main bank auditors is
significantly more than the mean value of audit opinion for companies choosing
non-main bank auditors indicating that main bank auditors render more modified
audit opinions.
[Insert Table 3 about here]

5.2 Auditor Choice
Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for the auditor choice model. All of
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the significant coefficients in the model are in the expected directions. As predicted
by H1, and indicated by the significant positive coefficient for the test variable,
MBankloan_equity, companies with higher ratios of main bank loans to equity are
more likely to choose the same auditors as their main banks. The results support the
hypothesis that the more dependent companies are on main bank loans, the more
likely they will choose their main banks’ external auditors to lower their capital
costs. The coefficient of the Market variable is significant at the 1 percent level,
which indicates that companies which are in the First Section Market are more
likely to choose the same external auditors as their main banks.
[Insert Table 4 about here]

5.3 Auditor Opinion
Table 5 presents the mean values of firm characteristics included in the auditor
choice and auditor opinion models partitioned by auditor type for the matched-pair
subsample with 1130 firm-year observations. There is no significant difference in
firm characteristics included in two models, which indicates that the self-selection
bias has been corrected very well through the propensity score matching process.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 6 presents the empirical results for the auditor opinion Model for both
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the original sample with 2095 firm-year observations and the matched-pair
subsample with 1130 firm-year observations. The coefficients for Auditor_choice in
both the original sample and the Propensity Matching Score sub-sample after
correcting for self-selection bias are significant at the 5 percent level. The results
are consistent with the hypothesis that main bank auditors are more likely to issue
modified opinions. As predicted, previous audit opinions correlate with current
audit opinions.

Smaller and less profitable firms are more likely to receive

modified opinions. Companies in the First Section Market are less likely to receive
qualified opinions than those in the Second Section Market.
[Insert Table 6 about here]

5.4 Sensitivity Tests
Four sets of sensitivity tests were conducted to examine the robustness of the
empirical results. First, I employ the Heckman two-step model to control the
self-selection bias. A major limitation of the Propensity Score Matching approach is
that matching is based only on observable variables and so it cannot control for
self-selection based on the unobservable variables (Heckman et al., 1997). Some
unobservable factors could influence both auditor choice and auditor opinion, such
as company policy and culture. Heckman (1979) derives a two-step method to
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correct for selectivity bias in linear regression models with normal errors, and
Dubin and Rivers (1989) employ the same basic conceptual framework to probit
and logit models, developing a two-stage binary probit/logit method to control for
self-selection bias in discrete-choice models. To address the self-selection problem,
I first simplify my model as follows:
Auditor Choice Equation: Auditor_Choice=αX+βZ+μ
Auditor Opinion Equation: Auditor_Opinion=δAuditor_Choice+γZ+θW+ε;
Where X is a vector of variables that only affect auditor choice but have no direct
effect on auditor Opinion, and Z is a vector of variables that affect both auditor
choice and auditor opinion. W is a vector of variables that only affect auditor
opinion but have no direct effect on auditor choice, while u and ε are error terms
correlated with each other.
In the first step, I construct the Inverse of Mills ratio (Imills – different
notation from what you used on a prior page), λ1and λ0 respectively, from the
auditor choice probit model. Then, for companies choosing main bank auditors
(Auditor_choice=1), the auditor opinion equation is:
[Auditor_opinion|Auditor_choice=1,Z,W]=δ+γZ+θW+ρбε

+ε (3)

For companies choosing Non-main bank auditors (Auditor_Choice=0), the auditor
opinion equation is:
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[Auditor_opinion|Auditor_choice=0,Z,W]=δ+γZ+θW+ρбε

+ε (4)

Where φ (•) and Φ (•) are the normal density and cumulative distribution functions,
respectively:

λ0 =

, λ1=

I combine equations (3) and (4) into the auditor opinion logit model:
Auditor_opinion=δ Auditor_Choice +γ Z+ θ W + Imills + ε
Thus, in the second step, I add the Inverse Mills ratio in the auditor opinion
logit model to correct for selectivity bias. The final results are presented in Table 7.
The coefficient of Auditor_choice is still significantly positive and consistent with
the results of the original logit regression of the auditor opinion Model. Thus, the
results of the Heckman logit two-stage method also provide empirical evidence that
main bank auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions than non-main bank
auditors after controlling the self-selection bias.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Second, I treat the member banks in a Financial Group as independent banks
instead of treating the entire Financial Group as a main bank. Based on this criterion,
I recalculate the main bank loans and rerun the auditor choice and auditor opinion
models (including Propensity Matching Score Model and Heckman two-step
model). The multivariate results in Table 4, 6 and 7 are qualitatively invariant to this
alternative criterion.
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Third, as mentioned above, main banks are usually the shareholders in the
borrowing companies and their maximum ownership is capped at 5 percent.
Although the direct ownership main banks can own is limited to 5 percent, they
may have indirect ownership through their subsidiaries or members of Keiretsu
Groups. Thus, the actual ownership rights of main banks in borrowing companies
may be understated. The main banks may exert these rights to influence auditor
selection in borrowing companies. However, it is difficult to measure the indirect
ownership rights of main banks. Therefore, I rely on the direct ownership rights that
main banks have to proxy for the actual ownership rights to test their influence on
auditor choice in borrowing companies. Including the Main Bank Ownership
variable in the auditor choice model, I finally get 1276 firm-year observations. The
regression result shows that the coefficient of the Main Bank Ownership variable
(MBank_Ownership) is significantly positive (0.2969), which indicates that the
more ownership rights that main banks have in borrowing companies, the more
likely that borrowing companies will choose main bank auditors. The results for
MBankloan_equity and other control variables are insensitive to including the
MBank_ownership variable and remain qualitatively consistent with the original
results.
Fourth, prior accounting research suggests that the absolute value of
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discretionary accruals in audited financial statements is an indicator of the degree to
which management is allowed by auditors to exercise accruals-based earnings
management. (Becker et al. 1998) Thus, discretionary accrual is another way to
measure audit quality and high quality audit is associated with conservative
discretionary accruals. Following Krishnan (2003), I estimate discretionary accruals
using the cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) accruals estimation model.
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model as
follows:
TACCRi,t/TASi,t-1=a11/TASi,t-1+a2 ∆REVi,t/TASi,t-1+a3 PPEi,t/TASi,t-1+ ei,t
Where TACCRi,t is total accruals for firm i in year t, TASi,t-1 is total assets in year t,
∆REVi,t is revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1, PPEi,t is property, plant, and
equipment at the end of year t., ei,t is the error term.
According to Krishnan (2003), total accruals are calculated as the difference
between net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and
cash flows from operating activities. Consistent with prior research, I estimate the
cross-sectional Jones model separately for each combination of industry code and
calendar year. Instead of using the two-digit US SIC codes, I use 4-digit GICS
codes for Japanese listed companies. The error term from this Jones model
represents the discretionary accruals. Table 8 reports the differences in three types
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of discretionary accruals between companies choosing main bank auditors and those
choosing non main bank auditors: absolute value of discretionary accruals,
income-increasing (positive)

discretionary accruals

and

income-decreasing

(negative) discretionary accruals. The results indicate that companies choosing main
bank auditors report less discretionary accruals than companies choosing non main
bank auditors in all three cases. The differences in mean value are statistically
significant at the 5 percent level for the absolute value of discretionary accruals and
income-increasing discretionary accruals. Overall, these results are consistent with
hypothesis 2 that audit quality is higher for main bank auditors than non main bank
auditors.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
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Chapter 6 Conclusions

I examine whether auditor choice is affected by the influence of main banks under
Japan’s institutional environment and analyze the auditor opinions based on the type
of auditors chosen, i.e., main bank auditors versus others. I expect that companies
with higher ratios of main bank loans to equity have stronger incentives to choose
the same external auditors as their main banks in order to reduce capital costs. I also
expect that main bank auditors are less likely to take part in audit collusion and
more likely to issue modified opinions to the borrowing companies than non-main
bank auditors because of their economic relationship with the main bank.
Using data on Japanese listed companies from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, I
provide empirical evidence that companies with more reliance on main bank loans
are more likely to choose their main banks’ external auditors. Using the Propensity
Score Matching method and the Heckman two-step binary probit model to control
for self-selection bias, the empirical results support the hypothesis that main bank
auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions to borrowing companies than
non-main bank auditors, providing evidence of higher audit quality from main bank
auditors. My findings contribute to the auditing literature by providing empirical
evidence of the economic influence of creditors (main banks) on the auditor choice
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of the borrowing companies and also on the audit quality of the auditors in a
bank-based market. There are two primary implications of my results.
First, unlike dispersed shareholders who can only rely on security laws to
prevent auditor collusion with managers, main banks in Japan can discipline their
auditors by cutting off their economic relationship with them if they provide
substandard work. This may shed light on future analytical auditing research
concerning agency problems among creditors, managers and auditors.
Second, my study also has implications for auditing practice. Given that main
bank auditors tend to provide higher quality audits, main banks could consider
requiring borrowing companies to hire their external auditors in debt agreements to
enhance audit quality.
There are several limitations of this study. First, I do not include audit fees in
the auditor choice model as Japanese listed companies do not disclose audit fee
information. Second, I do not consider the influence of indirect ownership rights of
main banks in borrowing companies on auditor choice as it is difficult to measure.
Despite these limitations, my exploratory research provides an initial understanding
of the influence of banks on auditor choice and auditor reporting in a bank-based
debt financing economy. Future research can further explore the role of auditors in
similar economies.
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Notes:
1. Shortly after the suspension, PwC acted quickly to stem client attrition by
setting up the new PricewaterhouseCoopers Aarata. Some of ChuoAoyama's
auditors moved to the new firm (Skinner and Srinivasan, 2010). ChuoAoyama
resumed operations on September 1, 2006 under the Misuzu name. However, by
this time, Misuzu had 30 percent fewer clients than did ChuoAoyama prior to its
suspension (The Daily Yomiuri, 2006).
2. During the sample period, some main banks switched their auditors. However,
only some of their borrowing companies followed their main banks to switch to
the new auditors. Therefore, this indicates that it is the borrowing companies'
voluntary behavior to choose the same auditor as their main banks, rather than
being imposed by main banks.
3. I calculate the ratio of financial expense to total bank loans to proxy for the
interest rates of total bank loans. The results indicate that the mean value of
interest rates for companies who chose main bank auditors is significantly less
than that for companies who chose non-main bank auditors (p-value is 0.044).
4. The Rules & Regulations of the Tokyo Stock Exchange list the Summary of Criteria for
Assignment to the First Section and Reassignment from the First Section to the Second
Section and draw a boundary line between the First and Second Section markets in
several respects such as number of shares listed, distribution of shares, listed market
capitalization, amount of net assets, amount of profit, market capitalization, opinion on
financial statements and trading volume. Companies which are above the boundary
lines in all these aspects can be assigned to the First Section while companies which are
below the boundary lines in any aspect are assigned or reassigned to the Second Section
market.

5. In some years, two banks merged into one larger bank; the larger bank may employ two
auditors of the two merged banks. In this situation, I let Auditor_choice equal 1 only if
the external auditor of the borrowing company is the same as one of these two auditors.
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Appendix. The Main Banks in my sample and Their Auditors
Name of Bank

2002

2003
DTT

2004

Chuo Mitsui Trust
DBJ
Hachijuni Bank
Hiroshima Bank
Mizuho Financial Group
Norinchukin Bank
Resona Group
Daiwa Bank
Asahi Bank
Shinsei Bank
SMBC
The Bank of Yokohama
Sumitomo Trust
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial
Group

DTT

BOTM
UFJ
Yamaguchi Bank
Chugoku Bank
Hokkoku
Kyoto
Shizuoka
77BANK

DTT
DTT
CA&DTT CA
AS
AS
AS
AS
SH
DTT
DTT
DTT
DTT
DTT
DTT

DTT
CA
AZ
AZ
SH
DTT
DTT
DTT

DTT
CA
AZ
AZ
SH
DTT
DTT
DTT

Chiba

SH

SH

SH

CA & SH SH
CA
CA
SH
SH
SH
DTT
DTT
AS
AS
DTT
DTT

SH

DTT
CA

2005

2006

2007

SH
CA
SH

DTT
DTT
DTT
CA
CA
Misuzu
DTT
DTT
DTT
AZ
AZ
AZ
SH
SH
SH
CA
CA
SH
SH&DTT SH&DTT DTT

DTT
DTT
DTT
AZ
SH
SH
DTT

DTT
SH
DTT

DTT
AZ
DTT

DTT
AZ
DTT

DTT
AZ
DTT
AZ

DTT
AZ
DTT
AZ

DTT

DTT

DTT

AZ

AZ

AZ

SH
DTT
DTT
DTT

SH
DTT
DTT
DTT

SH
DTT
DTT
DTT

SH

SH

SH

Notes:
(1) Auditor abbreviation- CA: ChuoAoyama (member of PWC); AZ: AZSA (member of KPMG)
AS: Asahi (member of AA; SH: Shin Nihon (member of EY)
(2) Bank abbreviation- DBJ: Development Bank of Japan; BOTM: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
SMBC: Sumitomo Mitsui Bank Corporation
(3) Member banks of Financial Group-Mizuho Financial Group: Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corporate
Bank and Mizuho Trust and Banking
Member banks of Resona Financial Group: Resona Bank, Saitama Resona Bank and the Kinki
Osaka Bank
Member banks of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ and
Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking
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Table 1. Descriptive information on data selection, auditor choice and auditor opinions

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2002-2008

149

198

199

262

303

617

367

2095

2002(%)

2003(%)

2004(%)

2005(%)

2006(%)

2007(%)

2008(%)

2001-2008(%)

Main Bank Auditor

64(43)

62(31)

63(32)

85(32)

94(31)

173(28)

119(32)

660(32)

Non-Main Bank Auditor

85(57)

136(69)

136(68)

177(68)

209(69)

444(72)

248(68)

1435(68)

149

198

199

262

303

617

367

2095

2002(%)

2003(%)

2004(%)

2005(%)

2006(%)

2007(%)

2008(%)

2001-2008(%)

Unqualified

118(80)

175(88)

198(99)

259(99)

296(98)

608(99)

360(98)

2014(96)

Modified

31(20)

23(12)

1(1)

3(1)

7(2)

9(1)

7(2)

81(4)

149

198

199

262

303

617

367

2095

Panel A: Data Selection
Sample Firms

Panel B: Types of auditor Choice

Total

Panel C: Types of audit opinion

Total
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Table 1. Descriptive information on data selection, auditor choice and
auditor opinions
Panel D: Auditor Opinion by Auditor Type
Main Bank Auditors
Modified

%

Unqualified

Non-Main Bank Auditors
%

Total

Modified

%

Unqualified

%

Total

2002

12

18.8

52

81.2

64

19

22.4

66

77.6

85

2003

10

16.1
5555

52

83.9

62

13

9.6

123

90.4

136

2004

1

1.6

62

98.4

63

0

0

136

100

136

2005

2

2.4

83

97.6
1

85

1

0.1

176

99.9

177

2006

3

3.2

91

96.8
5

94

4

1.9

205

98.1

209

2007

3

1.7

170

98.3

173

6

1.4

438

98.6

444

2008

1

0.8

118

99.2

119

6

2.4

242

97.6

248

Total

32

4.8

628

95.2

660

49

1386

94.2

1435
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3.4

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions
Panel A: Descriptive Statistic of Regression Variables
Variable

Mean

Sd

min

median

Max

Auditor_choice

0.315

0.465

0

0

1

Auditor_opinion

0.039

0.193

0

0

1

Opinion_lag

0.042

0.201

0

0

1

MBankloan_equity

0.180

0.237

-0.573

0.103

2.685

Leverage

0.637

0.149

0.174

0.652

1.221

Current_ratio

1.318

0.564

0.076

1.208

4.971

Size

19.030

1.545

15.094

18.976

23.187

ROA

0.037

0.046

-0.276

0.035

0.411

Loss

0.111

0.314

0

0

1

growth

0.048

0.116

-0.841

0.041

1.563

Market

0.877

0.328

0

1

1

Beta

0.882

2.020

-0.120

0.840

92.000

No.Subsidiary

19.890

47.058

0

2
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Inventory

0.132

0.076

0

0.125

0.526
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Panel B: Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Auditor_choice

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is the same as its
main bank, and 0 otherwise

Auditor_opinion

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s audit opinion is modified
for the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. I classify qualified opinions,
adverse opinions and disclaim as “modified opinions”

Opinion_lag

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s audit opinion is modified
for the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise

MBankloan_equity

The ratio of year-end main bank loans to shareholders funds (equity)

Leverage

The ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets

Current_ratio

The ratio of year-end current assets to current liabilities

Size

The natural logarithm of year-end total assets (Japan Yuan)

ROA

The ratio of net income before tax to year-end total assets

Loss

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the net income before tax less than
zero, otherwise 0.

Market

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the company is in the First Section
Market in the Tokyo Stock Exchange

Beta

Beta coefficient of the Capital Asset Pricing Model

Inventory

Year-end inventory divided by year-end total assets

Growth

(Total sales of current year divided by total sales of previous year)-1

Year2007

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the fiscal year is 2007

Year2008

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the fiscal year is 2008

Mymills

Inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman two-step model
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of firm characteristic variables partitioned
by Auditor Type (N=2095)
Firm Characteristics

Statistics

Auditor_opinion

Mean

0.034

0.048

S.D.

0.182

0.215

Mean

0.170

0.202

S.D.

0.205

0.294

Mean

0.631

0.651

S.D.

0.147

0.152

Mean

1.332

1.289

S.D.

0.555

0.582

Mean

18.974

19.151

S.D.

1.559

1.506

Mean

0.037

0.036

S.D.

0.047

0.043

Mean

0.109

0.115

S.D.

0.311

0.319

Mean

0.048

0.050

S.D.

0.119

0.111

Mean

0.861

0.912

S.D.

0.346

0.283

Mean

0.889

0.866

S.D.

2.431

0.333

Mean

18.756

22.356

S.D.

43.560

53.838

Mean

0.130

0.134

S.D.

0.074

0.080

MBankloan_equity

Leverage

Current_ratio

Size

ROA

Loss

Growth

Market

Beta

No.Subsidiary

Inventory

Non-Main Bank’s Auditor

Main Bank’s Auditor

Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
49

P-Value
0.1139

0.0047***

0.0042***

0.1049

0.0150**

0.5953

0.6627

0.7405

0.001***

0.8102

0.1038

0.2768

Table 4. Logistic Regression Results for Auditor Choice Model

Predicted

Coefficients

Z-statistics

P-Value

Sign
Explanatory Variables
Constant

?

-1.5297

-1.72

0.086*

MBankloan_equity

+

0.6769

2.68

0.007***

Leverage

+

0.1882

0.34

0.731

Market

+

0.5768

3.06

0.002***

No.Subsidiary

+

0.0011

0.89

0.376

Current_ratio

_

-0.0365

-0.3

0.766

Size

-

-0.0022

-0.05

0.964

ROA

+

0.4581

0.38

0.705

0.7066

1.06

0.288
0.564

Inventory
Growth

+

0.2522

0.58

Year_dumb2007

?

-0.1957

-1.68

0.093*

Year_dumb2008

?

-0.0235

-0.17

0.864

Pseudo R-squared

0.0121

Sample Size

2095

Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5. Mean value of firm characteristics partitioned by Auditor Type for
the matched-pairs subsample (N=1130)
Firm Characteristics

Non-Main Bank’s Auditor

Main Bank’s Auditor

P-Value

MBankloan_equity

0.182

0.184

0.9208

Leverage

0.640

0.646

0.5422

Current_ratio

1.322

1.294

0.4069

Size

19.148

19.125

0.7984

ROA

0.037

0.036

0.6958

Loss

0.122

0.115

0.7131

Beta

0.855

0.863

0.6996

Market

0.915

0.904

0.5338

Inventory
Inventory

0.132
0.132

0.134
0.134

0.5419
0.5419

No.Subsidiary

21.393

20.142

0.6651

Growth

0.046

0.049

0.6692

Notes: All p-values are two-tailed.
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Table 6. Logistic regression results for Auditor Opinion Model
Predicted
Sign

Original Sample

Sub-sample after PSM

Coefficients

P-Value

Coefficients

P-Value

Explanatory Variables
Constants

?

-2.2527

0.2190

-2.0295

0.4550

Auditor_Choice

+

0.5906

0.0290**

0.8943

0.0300**

Opinion_lag

+

3.4178

0.0000***

3.9867

0.0000**

Leverage

+

0.1560

-1.3844

*
0.4270

Current_ratio

-

0.9200

-0.0136

0.9730

Size

-

0.0001

0.9990

-0.0462

0.7750

ROA

-

-7.7441

0.0200**

-5.2152

0.3060

Loss

+

0.2202

0.6250

0.7356

0.2630

Beta

-

-0.1069

0.7990

0.3805

0.5150

Market

-

-0.8326

0.0510*

-1.2283

0.0540*

Inventory

+

1.3068

0.4680

0.2741

0.9180

-1.6405
0.0276

Pseudo R2
Sample Size

0.2570

0.3524

2095

1130

Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 7. Heckman second-stage Logit regression results for Audit Opinion
Model
Predicte
d Sign

Original Sample

Adjusted by Inverse

Coefficients

P-Value

mills P-Value
Coefficients

Explanatory Variables
Constants

?

-2.2527

0.2190

-0.2166

Auditor_Choice

+

0.5906

0.0290**

0.5501

Opinion_lag

+

3.4178

0.0000***

3.3566

Leverage

+

0.1560

-2.2550

Current_ratio

-

0.9200

0.0466

0 0.8670

Size

-

0.0001

0.9990

0.0142

0.8980

ROA

-

-7.7441

0.0200**

-8.0797

0.0170**

Loss

+

0.2202

0.6250

-0.1951

0.6670

Beta

-

-0.1069

0.7990

-0.0922

0.8270

Market

-

-0.8326

0.0510*

-1.1957

Inventory

+

1.3068

0.4680

1.0426

**
0.5670
0.0490

Inverse Mills

?

-1.3799

0.4000

-1.6405
0.0276

Pseudo R2
Sample Size

0.943
0.046*

0
*

***
0.101
0.0000

0.2570

0.258

2095

2095

Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 8 Mean value of discretionary accruals partitioned by Auditor type
Mean
Type of Accruals

main bank
auditors

non main bank
auditor

p-value

0.0221

0.0247

0.0408**

Absolute Discretionary Accruals

Income-increasing Discretionary
0.0212
0.0251
0.0298**
Accruals
Income-decreasing Discretionary
-0.0227
-0.0246
0.2001
Accruals
Notes: all p-values are one-tail. The sample consists of 1115 firm-year
observations. The number of cross-sectional regressions based on combination of
4-digit GICS code and calendar year is 49.
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